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Summary. The concept of time is critical in evolutionary thought, but rarely has
it been considered as an object of theoretical research by evolutionary biologists.
Evolution is an organism’s possibility of access to the future; in other words, evo-
lutionary reward is paid out as increased time. Replicating entities are granted time,
but for them, time only serves to allow replication and evolution, and to further
expand the frontier of time. The present review discusses the possible influence of
considering time not as a pure dimension (or an a priori intuitive condition of
human experience) but as an object in itself. At least as a metaphor, time can be
considered as a self-replicating entity rooted in physical (including biological)
beings, with the result of producing dimensional time. Time self-replication forces
beings to replicate, which, in turn, further sustains the replication of time. In that
sense, time-replication may constitute the driving force, i.e., the basic engine, pro-
viding directional energy to the evolutionary process. The philosophical roots,
caveats, and perspectives of this hypothesis are presented here. The metaphor of
replicating-time plays with the possibility of viewing time not as a merely regula-
tory component of scientific inquiry but instead, as a real and creative constituent
of nature and, for this reason, an object worthy of research in the natural sciences.
[Int Microbiol 2005; 8(2):81-91]
Key words: evolution · evolutionary time · time (as a replicating entity) · time
(nature) 
Evolution and the nature
of time
Die Zeit ist die Unruhe des Seins
Anton Neuhäuser, Zeit und Sein, 1957
Il est vrai qu’on n’est pas d’accord sur ce qui se gagne ni sur ce qui
se perd entre le tour de la naissance et celui de la mort
Henri Bergson, L’évolution creatrice, 1907
Time and directional change in evolution
The fundamental question in evolution remains largely unex-
plored and, consequently, unanswered: What constitutes the
driving force leading organisms to evolve in particular direc-
tions? Obviously, the question whether or not there is a direc-
tion (note that we are not mentioning progress) in biological
evolution is a matter of controversy [37,46]. Elementary intu-
ition suggests that there is a general trend of moving from
simplicity to complexity. As Maynard-Smith pointed out, the
first simple organisms had nowhere to go but up, to increas-
ing complexity over time [39]. Indeed, the same intuition is
at the bases of Spencer’s law of evolution [49]. Complexity
means intra-organismal complexity, as well as complexity in
number, sort, and type of organisms, and complexity in the
associations of organisms. Indeed, complexity means an
association and implies a structured interaction [9,10]. 
At first sight, this tendency to increasing biological com-
plexity could correspond to the analogous tendency to
increasing complexity (from the random to the structured)
that is also found in inanimate matter, probably including the
entire expanding Universe. As Spencer suggested a long time
ago [50], since living beings only exist (survive) if they con-
stantly adapt to their environments, the driving force of the
Fernando Baquero
Department of Microbiology,
Ramón y Cajal University
Hospital (IMSALUD),
Madrid, Spain, and Laboratory
of Bacterial Evolutionary
Biology, National Center for
Astrobiology (INTA-CSIC),
Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain
INTERNATIONAL MICROBIOLOGY (2005) 8:81-91
www.im.microbios.org
Received 15 January 2005
Accepted 10 February 2005
Address for correspondence:
Departamento de Microbiología
Hospital Universitario Ramón y Cajal
Carr. Colmenar km 9,100
28034 Madrid, Spain
Tel. +34-913368330. Fax +34-913368809
E-mail: fbaquero.hrc@salud.madrid.org
82 INT. MICROBIOL. Vol. 8, 2005
changing forms of life may be changes in their inanimate
environments—non-living wheels transmitting movement to
the living wheels in the universal clock. Changes in the com-
plexity of the inanimate world produce changes in the structure
of biological beings. At second sight, we realize that the corre-
spondence between environmental and biological changes
may not be linear. For instance, the speed of biological evolu-
tion seems to increase during those periods in which there are
no (apparent) major changes in the evolution of inanimate mat-
ter. In that case, an effect based on the relative sizes of the
clock wheels could be taking place; that is, high-speed evolu-
tion in the small biological wheel could be needed to adapt to
low-speed, but significant evolution in the large inanimate
wheel. In microbiology, there are some experimental examples
in which very small differences created along gradients emerg-
ing in inanimate environments create significant changes in
selection and presumably in evolution [7,8]. There is also evi-
dence that evolutionary rate and genetic complexity may
accelerate in particular environments [11,42]. At third sight,
we could arrive at a trivial notion, i.e., biological evolution
might accelerate independently from non-biologically driven
changes in the inanimate world, because life is self-catalyzing:
the greater the variety of life forms, the greater the variety
required to adapt to this variety. This hypothesis has been stud-
ied by Waddington [53].
Such initial reflections do not help to provide any light on
the first basic question: what constitutes the driving force, the
basic engine providing directional energy to the evolutionary
process? The notion of evolution was born in relation to the
struggle for life. The action of the living being (any unity of
selection) is confronted with the reaction of the environment,
and evolution enables the organism to survive. Certainly, the
basic question can be also stated in this way: what explains
the (apparent) intrinsic tendency of living beings to evolve in
order to survive? How does a given direction of the time-
arrow influence currently living organisms? How may the
presumptive benefits of a future life decide (or model) the
behavior of present organisms? In other words, how could
the future act as an attractor driving the dynamics of the evo-
lutionary system? In the old terms that Emmanuel Kant used
to define biological matter [32], is there a purposive mecha-
nism of evolution? We can simply answer that the last three
questions are false questions, concluding that, in biology, any
notion of purpose is just an anthropic illusion. Evolution
could eventually be conceived as a purposeless effect, a pas-
sive, and not an active attribute of biological beings. In fact,
there are no winners in the struggle for life, but just blind
(malgré soi) survivors of environmental changes. But, in any
case, the main, almost metaphysical question still remains:
why do biological beings tend to replicate? Why feed a sys-
tem devoted to survival and preservation of a particular bio-
logical identity? What fuels evolutionary biology?
Why replicate?
We should consider that the maintenance of biological iden-
tity cannot be identified as the evolutionary goal, because
such self-fidelity may not be preserved over long-term evo-
lution. Most of us agree that, considering a given (short) peri-
od of time, species of organisms may be well described as
discrete phenomena of nature, tending to protect the integri-
ty of a particular gene pool [40]. However, if very long peri-
ods of time are considered, the once harmonious gene com-
bination may decrease in competitive effectiveness and,
therefore, may be modified by evolution [10]. To solve this
“species problem,” it has been postulated that the identity
(specificity) of organisms should be conceived along the
time-arrow. In this way, species are spatio-temporal units
[22,31]; that is, “evolutionary species” [48] having “histori-
cal essences” (Sykora 1995, personal communication). We
can imagine these time-dimensioned species, or chronospe-
cies, as timeworms, essentially uniform cylinders aligned
along the temporal dimension. They have their counterparts
in the more conventional space-dimensioned species, which
could be called topospecies. The possibility of reconciling
such (respectively) essentialist and nominalist approaches
will probably arrive from a future consideration of the object
“species” in a four-dimensional space-time frame! A system-
atic analysis of all these possibilities was presented by
Stephen J. Gould, in the light of the hypothesis of hierarchi-
cal evolution, discussed in his last book, The Structure of
Evolutionary Theory [27].
The essential component of the evolutionary process
appears to be maintenance of the ability to replicate [41]. To
exist is to survive, as punctual existence is nothing. To sur-
vive is to replicate, and hence to replicate is to exist. Both the
term and the concept of survival (super-vivere) mean ‘going
beyond the current life span, so that a certain trend to gain the
future (a desire, again in Kant’s terminology) seems to be
deeply ingrained in biological matter. As Jorge R. de
Santayana said, repetition is the only form of permanence
that nature can achieve. In the words of Bergson, the persist-
ence of life consists in a series of palpitations [12]. But,
again, what constitutes the driving force for such an interest in
the future? The historical fate of an organism is actually noth-
ing, and it is impossible to believe that this absence can attract
anything real. Therefore, if external influences are discarded,
then the driving force should be internal to the organism, an
apparently intrinsic property linked to biological matter.
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Returning to the classic metaphor of the biological clock,
we could imagine that there are minuscule energetic wheels
in any living organism, transmitting after each round its
obsessive, fractal message to the whole organism: you repli-
cate as I am replicating. An idea of that kind probably led
Richard Dawkins’s to propose his famous “selfish genes”
theory [16]. Replicators are able to influence the production
of survival machines for themselves. Is gene replication the
driving force of evolution? Even if it were so, the basic ques-
tion remains again unanswered, perpetuates throughout the
different biological levels, and is increasingly difficult to
answer: what forces a gene to replicate, to survive? Are
genes, and in general replicators, working for some other ele-
ment, the very last selfish element?
Where is the profit of the evolutionary process? Evolution
is based on profit, but for whom is this profit intended?
Species are either modified over time or eliminated; individ-
ual organisms disappear; gene pools are shuffled by horizon-
tal gene transfer. Is the profit for Life an abstraction? If so,
under which terms would an evolutionary benefit be
obtained? At this point, the answer is relatively simple: repli-
cation and survival of all biological organisms only serve to
gain space and time. Simplifying Wilson’s distinction [55],
gain in space is dominance, whereas gain in time is success.
Indeed, gain in space facilitates the settlement of more repli-
cating entities and assures a supply of energy for replication.
As the only sense of replication is to gain a future, finally, all
evolutionary rewards are paid with more time. By replicat-
ing, organisms obtain time. For them, however, time only
serves to allow replication, to evolve, and to further expand
the frontier of time. Modern artificial-life evolutionary stud-
ies use digital organisms [1,56]. These are self-replicating
computer programs that compete for central processing unit
(CPU) time, which is the fuel needed for their replication
[33]. Evolutionary reward is paid in expanding time. In a
sense, time is the only selector; only if a given instant of time
is surpassed, is another bit of time provided to the organism.
In other words, time is both the selector and what is selected;
organisms are, in this sense, co-selected with time, and pushed
in such a way into the evolutionary road. 
Is time something other than a dimension?
In this theoretical context, we could try to imagine time as
nothing more than a cold pure dimension, as a Kantian a pri-
ori intuitive condition of experience, or as a framework for
the subject’s power of representation. Let us consider, at least
as an exploratory metaphor in evolutionary theoretical
research, time as something more than an object only in
appearance, but as a thing, a true object. The nature of this
time-object may contribute to the emergence of new events.
It is difficult to conceive of an evolving nature as based only
in physics or chemistry, whose laws tend to assure symmetry
and equilibrium. But what if we consider time as an objective
component of changing material objects, forcing them to
change? It is the asymmetrical nature of time [28] that infects
material objects and creates an evolutionary asymmetrical
trend. To explain its asymmetrical nature, time may be well
conceived as the ultimate self-replicating entity—in a broad
sense, as a replicator; that is, “anything in the universe of
which copies are made” [17]. 
Now we should approach the possibility that time needs
matter to replicate within. Time cannot exist without matter.
Its growth depends on the evolutionary success of time-
expanding replicating entities, in our case, biological individ-
uals. This means that time may be imagined as a parasite of
biological matter. A parasite that, like other parasites,
expands at the expenses of its host’s matter and energy In the
host, the end of time is death, which occurs when the parasite
has totally exhausted the host’s biological energy. By con-
trast, the successful survival and replication of the host
assures time’s replication, which forces the host to change
and adapt, thereby fueling the evolutionary process. Selfish
time transmits an obsessive signal: you replicate as I am
replicating. Survive and evolve to replicate. Everything
replicates for the profit of time, but only time replicates for
its own profit. The nature of time is only to replicate, but
doing so may prime the basic engine of evolution. Maybe the
best expression of the signal is; reproduce as I am replicat-
ing. The wise differentiation between replicators and repro-
ducers, coined by Szathmary and Maynard-Smith [51], may
also be applied here, at least as a general concept. In our the-
oretical context, if time is the ultimate replication entity, able
to produce an unlimited heredity or repeated units, then
organisms are simply reproducers, able to expand time after
time. Evolution assures the permanence of organisms, the
real time-machines. They serve not to travel in time, but to
produce time, to get more and more organisms, and thus
more time, and thus more evolutionary time. 
The hypotheses of a directional arrow resulting from nat-
ural time replication in biological matter could help to
explain the directional behavior of the evolutionary process.
In fact, evolution means directional orientation of biological
changes [25]; in our hypothesis, the essence of the evolution-
ary process is to produce time with time. The emphasis on
survival (necessarily of the fittest, again a conventional tau-
tology) in evolutionary thinking expresses only an operative
aspect of the process. The survivor is merely the organism
that produces time; indeed it is a survivor because it produces
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time. Therefore, it is the most evolved, which means the most
advanced of its lineage in time-production. Let us imagine
that the time required to build and to maintain a non-replica-
tive organism vanishes after its individual life span. The
energy invested in expanding time is lost through the process.
By contrast, evolutionarily successful replicating organisms
contribute in an important way to spreading time.
The metaphor that is examined in this review is, like any
other metaphor, necessarily speculative, or at its best, based
on some philosophical arguments and not on particular facts.
But there is no such a thing as philosophy-free science [18],
and purely mental exercises on basic problems are required
from time to time. As was stated a few years ago, the fact of
the matter is that we simply cannot escape metaphorical
thinking in science [19]. 
The nature of the time-dimension and
the nature of time as a replicating entity
The philosophical question underlying considering time as a
replicating entity is undoubtedly the definition of time. There
are at least three possibilities of how to conceive of time; (1)
as an immobile “cosmic wastebasket” sitting there waiting
for events to be deposited into it; (2) as a dimension that
serves to manifest relations between events, including
changes (durations); and (3) as an object (thing) in itself.
Since everything we know, including ourselves and also our
thoughts, is time-contaminated, we have the innate (anthropic)
tendency to consider time as an absolute dimension. Because
of its apparent universality, time serves in practice to establish
correspondences among those types of events that influence all
aspects of our experience. Indeed, time, as space, has been
considered as an intuition with the dynamic function of posit-
ing a manifold of intuitions as appearances. The experience
and the consequent description of life, and certainly of evo-
lution, is entirely dependent on time as a formal element of
intuition. John A. Wheeler proposed the concept of “observ-
er participancy description” of the universe, in which the cre-
ator of time is the human observer [54]. From Kant’s point of
view, time by itself is not an apprehensible object, as it is not
an object of perception whose systematic connection can be
termed experience. This concept became an obsession for
Kant during his last days, and he re-iterated it many times in
his dramatic last notes on the natural sciences [32]. As in the
case of the definition of the color green, anybody intuitively
knows what green is, but nobody can relate it to someone
else’s experience about what is green (at least, the green feel-
ing), without resorting to the tautology “green is the color of
green things”. Beginning with Aristotle, time has been con-
ventionally considered as the distance between two events:
time is the measure of change with respect to before and
after. As in the case of green, this definition is of extreme log-
ical weakness, because its main conceptual components—
change, before, and after—tautologically imply the defined
time. The same is true if we use the word “event” in the def-
inition. Can time be defined in the absence of time-based
concepts? Mono-dimensional space may be defined as the
distance between two points. Here, distance implies space
again. Because of these difficulties, time and space were
defined by Kant as a priori conditions of experience. The
application of anthropic principle justifies Kant’s conclusion:
since humans are located in this particular time-frame, every-
thing will be understood in the same time dimension. If we
consider time or space as mere dimensions, it is certainly
tremendously difficult to reach an accurate definition.
Let us now examine again the possibility of defining time
as a naturally replicating object by proposing that time is a
self-replicative natural entity rooted in matter; as a conse-
quence of time’s replication, matter changes. Self-replication
should be interpreted here in the sense of autopoiesis [52].
Initially, this seems again to be a tautology. Nevertheless, this
definition includes: (i) the concept that time is a natural ele-
ment (entity); (ii) that itself-replicates; (iii) that it is matter-
dependent; and (iv) that the change in the dimensional time
of matter depends on it. In order to eliminate the tautology,
we need to differentiate between naturally replicating time
(time-element; the replicating entity) and dimensional time,
in which the time-element is converted (to a certain extent,
expressed). 
Obviously, the major scolio in our time-as-a-replicating-
entity metaphor is the nature of the thing that the time-ele-
ment (as an object) actually is in the objective world. Without
continuous conversion into dimensional time, difficult for us
to imagine how the time-element functions as a replicating
entity (implying ancestors and successors). Indeed, the pro-
cession from ancestors to successors implies time; the time-
ancestor in replication needs time to give rise to its time-suc-
cessor. We could imagine that the time-replicating entity is
constantly transformed into a time-dimension, enabling repli-
cation itself. With this conversion, it is possible to imagine
time as consisting of elementary “chronons”, comprising
ancestors and successors, and that each element-successor is
able to eliminate its corresponding element-ancestor. This
notion is reminiscent of Greek myths, in which intrinsic
forces mediate the flow of time. This flow is made up of suc-
cessive time generations. Succession by opposition is only
possible if we can imagine time as having a discontinuous
(generational) nature. One of the Greek expressions for time,
aiwn, was probably coined from the root yu or ayu, express-
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ing “source of life”, and later “vital force” (the word youth,
from the Latin juventus, is a derivative). Classic myths about
time, in which Uranus, Chronos (Saturn), and Zeus, are the
the major characters, have in common an internal father-son
or son-father obsessive annihilation. This reflects a very
accurate intuitive representation of the essentially sequential
nature of the flow of time. Each father–instant replicates in a
new son–instant that kills its father. In neoplatonic philoso-
phy, and particularly among the orphic fragments, an obscure
time-god entity (Chronos) is primarily responsible for the
unfolding of the universe (the Hegelian Entwicklung) from
the primordial egg; that is, time as a primary engine. Perhaps
this was an ancient way of expressing the following concept.
Because of its nature as a primary replicating entity, time
generates order (including the time dimension) from a previ-
ously random, chaotic world. It may be that order itself is (or
was) time-dependent. In other words, the selective advantage
of order over chaos in spatially extended systems may con-
sist of its ability to replicate because of time. 
To facilitate an intuitive appreciation of the possible
nature of biologically produced time–element, we could pro-
pose a comparison with another well known biologically pro-
duced derivative, such as heat (calories). As in the case of
time, heat is produced by replicating organisms and is dissi-
pated by death. For obvious reasons, heat (the fire of Greeks)
was classically considered to be the soul of animal matter.
Forcing the analogy with time, we could imagine that heat is
a replicating entity, a parasite of matter (as there is no heat
without matter), and also a parasite of living beings, forcing
them to replicate and to evolve to increase the quantity of
biologically produced heat. Everything about our heat
hypothesis looks similar to the time-replicating hypotheses,
except for a major point; Heat is not directional, but dispersive,
and there is not a heat-arrow exerting directional pressure. 
Time in evolution: time for event
formation and evolution
In considering time as a replicating entity, matter is contam-
inated with a time-parasite, and the time dimension begins to
flow. Obviously, no time exists without matter, as no strict
parasite exists without a host. A corollarium of this concept
is that matter should precede time, and we must admit the
possibility of a time a-dimensional material world. Thus, the
time-replicating entity would have emerged as a parasite only
(at random) in certain parts (singularities) of a previous
simultaneous universe. If that were the case, then a-temporal
matter could exist even today. By applying classical means of
mental representation, time could be also conceived as the
anima, the changing-moving force, and as the soul of matter.
In this perspective, the expression “inanimate matter” is
much more restrictive, describing only the presence of mat-
ter before time, in a purely spatial universe. The linkage
between time and matter was also a classic theological ques-
tion: “What did God do before creating the universe?” But
here, in the internal logic of theology, “before” has no sense.
Saint Augustine considered time as non-existing before the
beginning of matter, and a property of the created universe
[3; implicitly in Confessions, IV: 11]. In a certain way, that
reflects the idea of the matter-dependent nature of time, if not
of the material nature of time itself. 
Applying our metaphor to biological matter, we have sug-
gested that time produces time through the intermediate of
organismal replication. In this case, the time-replicating ele-
ment might be called biologically generated time, and the
result is visible as dimensional time, which may be con-
ceived as the phenotype of replicating time. In our model, the
time-replicating entity generates dimensional time for event
formation. The signal for the birth of a new organism may
have originated because the time-replicating entity was repli-
cating; but once that occurs, the organism has time. In other
words, it receives the time-heritage (or time-parasite) of its
ancestor. 
The acquired time is converted into dimensional time,
and enables the organism to cultivate those events that assure
multiplication and hence the transmission of its time-replicat-
ing entities to its successors. If replication does not take
place, time is lost. Once the host organism is exhausted by
time, its time is dissipated. Species with very low numbers of
rarely reproducing individuals are at risk of extinction
because time is at risk of being dissipated in these species,
impeding the event processes of adaptation. By contrast,
species with high densities of individuals and high replica-
tion rates (such as bacterial species) produce huge densities
of time for event formation and evolution. This point is dis-
cussed below.
Event formation in the biological 
and physical world
A correspondence can be found between the driving role of
time in the production of events (evolution) in the biological
and the physical (cosmological) world. This does not imply
that the presumed object “time” is necessarily the same in
both contexts. One of the advantages of the liberation of the
concept of time from its absolute character of ens rationis is
the possibility of considering the heterogeneity of time.
Different types of time in different places, perhaps with dif-
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ferent replication rates according to the different material
hosts, suggest different tempus and modes in branching evo-
lution. The discussion on the influence of time in the
Entwicklung of the physical world is beyond the scope of this
work. But the key facts resulting from the theory of relativi-
ty, i.e., the existence of a limit in time-speed and the modifi-
cations of time-flow by physical force fields (for instance,
gravitational), as well as the problem of simultaneous meas-
urements, leading to the principle of indeterminacy, tend to
support the non-purely dimensional abstract nature of time.
The theory of quantum gravity indeed suggests that time is
constructed from discrete elements [14]. In any case, it is
curious that the concepts of quantum physics have con-
tributed very little to biology.
As Stephen Hawking said, time not only affects but is
also affected by everything that happens in the universe [30].
The controversial part of this sentence is how time affects, or
is affected. Time as a dimension cannot affect, or be affected
by anything, just as a y-axis cannot affect the coordinates of
any point, or as the coordinates cannot affect the axis. The y-
axis by itself is absolutely nothing but a virtual line to place
particular values on. The values define the coordinate, not the
axis. Particular events (placed in a time t-axis) modify reali-
ty, but not the dimension of time itself. The axis of time can-
not modify events. If we seriously say that time affects, or is
affected by, objects in the universe, we are implicitly saying
that time is an object, and not a dimension. If that is true, then
how can time be differentiated from other objects in nature? 
According to the view of Einstein, time (space–time) has
an built-in tendency to expand. How can an axis, the t dimen-
sional axis, expand, if time is only an entity of pure reason?
Only things can expand; the expansion of mentally derived
entities can be better defined as imagination. Similarly, how
can space–time attract the matter of the universe without
being itself an object? In more biological terms, how can
time affect a physiological process such as aging? Coming
back to the concepts of Kant, maybe time does not affect
physiological processes at all, and the expression “time
affects” is only a subjective, mental representation of a direc-
tional series of phenomena occurring in biological organiza-
tion. This view maintains the mystery of what on Earth may
produce the directional, sequential series of changes that
characterize the evolutionary process. But we can imagine
that there is a time that objectively affects biological process-
es, acting as a real force and mediated by the activity of real,
objective elements. The concept of space–time as a mere
receptacle in which physical phenomena happen may change
to one depicting space–time as the origin and driving force of
the evolution of the physical world itself. This is the
metaphor that we are exploring here. 
Replicating time: the time arrow
Conventional dimensional time is considered to be uniform
and constant over time [43], again a self-referenced defini-
tion, as the intellect is “accustomed to think the moving by
means of the unmovable” [12]. How is it that time might
change without other standards of time that can be used to
measure it? That is another mystery of the sort with which
mathematics is strangely replete (13). The hypothesis of time
as a replicating entity may allow an escape from such logic,
by emphasizing the distinction between replicating time and
time as a dimension. The distinction between these two kinds
of times was proposed by Newton in his Principia, which
described a real absolute time, that “flows by its own nature”;
and a “relative” time (or duration), an ens rationis, that
serves only to measure and that “is frequently used instead of
the real time”. The time arrow (and its projection, eternity) is
a anthropic image of perceived relative or dimensional time,
but it cannot be applied to fragmented, replicating natural
time, which depends on matter. If dimensional time results
from natural, replicating time, and if natural time is matter-
dependent (because every parasite needs a host), there is the
possibility of a heterogeneity in the time arrow. This possibil-
ity has been already mentioned by others [24,25]. In a sense,
time arrows point to different directions, changing in trajec-
tory, but in all cases they are directionally and irreversibly
oriented . In other words, they resemble natural objects in
evolution.
There is an intuitive attraction of biologists, influenced by
the observation of the apparent cycles of reproduction of liv-
ing organisms, to the cycling of time [35]. The possibility of
a time cycle (moving from the present to the past, in the
Newtonian view of time) will be difficult or impossible to
reconcile with any autopoietic view of time producing time.
A replicating entity produces a progeny, which tends to sep-
arate from its ancestors. This separation is essentially due to
dimensional time being generated by replicating time; to a
certain extent, the interposition of time is causes increased
distance as well as divergence between members of the prog-
eny. In general, we can imagine that dimensional time spread
produces a (physical?) separation between time-replicating
elements and their offspring.
It is intuitively clear that any arrow reflects a non-equilib-
rium system, perhaps pointing to a final equilibrium. The
thermodynamic arrow of time is considered to be the direc-
tion of time in which disorder or entropy increases [15, 30,
36], which relates to the irreversibility of time. In discussing
dissipative structures [44], Ilya Prigogine quoted Erwin
Schrödinger: “There should be something in the mechanism
BAQUERO
87INT. MICROBIOL. Vol. 8, 2005
of life that prevents life degradation, there should be a type
of irreversible phenomenon” [45,47]. We could indeed con-
sider a time-driven increase in biological expansion and com-
plexity. Increasing complexity assures the diversification of
beings, and consequently survival in the form of the accretion
of replicating entities and time expansion. The cosmological
arrow of time refers to the direction of time in which the uni-
verse expands. Again, in the time-replicating view, the
expansion of the universe might be considered as triggered
by this replicating time (but we leave the discussion of this
point to physics). The only possible arrow resulting from the
dynamics of time replication is the direction (probably, direc-
tions, or space) that the time progeny generates during its
expansion. Like most replicating entities, at least during cer-
tain phases of growth, time might even expand exponential-
ly. An example of this kind of growth is the documented
accelerated expansion of the universe. But what is the limit
then of the expansion of time? If the time-parasite is depend-
ent upon its matter-host, the limit should be the extreme dilu-
tion of matter. The end of time will arrive when the concen-
tration of matter at any location of the universe reaches zero;
that is, the limit is the nothingness. Paradoxically, as in the
case of parasite-prey interactions, time will collapse when
after having reached its maximum dimension—unless, anal-
ogous to other parasitic replicating entities, a parasite (time)-
prey (matter) equilibrium is reached. This implies that time
only expands when a critical concentration of matter is avail-
able. We are far from converting our metaphor into a testable
hypothesis, but these predictions may serve as the basis of a
future model and experimental work. 
Time and biological replicating units:
interactive models
Figure 1 summarizes some of the models of possible interac-
tions between time and biological replicating units. The first
model (Fig. 1A) considers that replication, and hence evolu-
tionary changes, in biological organisms are fully independ-
ent from the flow of time—that here, only dimensional time
plays a role. Even if time could be considered as a chain of
time-replicating units, they would be totally unrelated to bio-
logical activity The second model suggests that the flow of
time-replicating units influences the flow of biological
change, so that different time-inputs trigger biological
flow—no matter that the organism is formed by discrete units
limited in time (Fig. 1B) or as a trans-individual time-worm
organism (Fig. 1C). The third model provides for the possi-
bility that the accretion of time depends on biological repli-
cation or change: time-replicating units trigger biological
replication, but this change also produces time, which is used
to trigger the next biological change (Fig. 1D). Eventually, a part
of the biologically replicating entity remains unchanged (Fig. 1E),
in accordance with the theory of endurantism (Fig. 1F). In this
third model, it could be considered that the process of transfer-
ring its replication energy to a biological unit exhausts each
time-unit, but this energy is sequentially recovered as a result
of successful biological replication and change (Fig. 1E). A
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Fig. 1. Different views of the interactions of time (squares, left side) with
biological units (ovals, right side). Different intensities of gray represent
sequential changes (events) in biological units; arrows indicate hypothetical
effects. (A) Time flows independently from biological units. Note that time-
flow can be represented as a sequence of discrete time units, each one influ-
encing the emergence of the following one. (B) The flow of time units influ-
ences the flow of changes in biological units. (C) Similar to (B), but biolog-
ical unit are represented as a single, discrete continuum, with different man-
ifestations over time. (D) Time-units influence changes in biological units,
as in (B), but changes in biological units also influence the progression of
time series. (E) Like (D), but considering that biological units contain an
unchanging core. (F) Each change in the biological units occurs at the
expense of an exhaustion of time, whereas a completion change in the bio-
logical units restores the loss of time.
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necessary corollarium of this model is that there should be a
local time, linked and interdependent upon local matter. Note
that if the amount of time units produced by biological repli-
cation decreases, replication itself will decrease, so that,
eventually, the local production of time and biological
change will stop, resulting ultimately in death (Fig. 2).
The model of mutual interaction (interdependence)
between the replication of time and that of biological matter
can be expanded by considering that the biological units may
interact with other biological units, whose replication will
contribute also to the production of successive time-units. In
this sense, any increase in the local density, variability, or
connectivity of biological units is expected to result in a local
increase of time. One may wonder whether the 3.85-billion-
year period of conventional dimensional time, since the pre-
sumed origin of life on Earth, has been functionally equiva-
lent for every type of living organisms. For instance, we
could imagine that the absolute amount of cells, cell replica-
tion, cell differentiation, and cell interactions throughout the
multiple environments colonized by the microbial world
have multiplied the production of microbial time, so that, in
fact, the evolutionary time for microbes has been by far much
greater than that for other organisms. The events characteriz-
ing rapid evolution in certain periods (punctuated evolution)
may not be more rapid in the absolute sense: rather, they
accumulate when a high density and complexity of biologi-
cal units favors the local production of evolutionary time,
giving rise to increasing amounts of change and complexity.
This concept is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Roots, caveats, and perspectives 
of the time-replication metaphor 
The concept of time as an objective replicating entity is an
extremely intuitive concept that was certainly present—but
rarely recognized as such—in the minds of several philoso-
phers, including Heraclitus and Zeno. According to the cre-
ationist perspective, time is a kind of “creature” (as proposed,
for instance, by Maimonides), which implies a certain com-
munity with other more conventionally created beings. As
E.H. Gombrich noted, the capacity of the human mind to
defeat the flux of time and to perceive events that, strictly
speaking, no longer exist provoked St Augustine to some of
his profoundest meditations on the nature of time [23]. He
realized than even in calling one syllable long and other short
we are comparing sensations that had vanished (St
Augustine, Confessions). The continuous presence of a given
sensation could thus be interpreted as the persistence of some
kind of physical “time-element”. Henri Bergson [12] applied
the same type of reasoning to evolution: “Evolution implies
a real persistence of the past in the present, a duration which
is, as it were, a hyphen, a connecting link”. Leibniz, particu-
larly after the Pacidius Philalethi (1676), considered all con-
tinuum, including time and space continua, as formed by dis-
crete, substantial elements able to replicate harmoniously ad
infinitum [20,29]. These monads certainly constitute one of
the essential roots of our metaphor. Indeed, it was during the
first quarter of the twentieth century that philosophers were
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Fig. 2. The growth curve of a biological entity (black squares) and its hypo-
thetical influence on the production of replicating time-units (white circles).
Dimensional time is shown on the abscissa, and the number of units of the
biological entity, or units of replicating time, is shown on the ordinate. Once
replication and change start to be limited, the production of time decreases.
For a non-replicating organism (black circles), evolutionary time is very
scarce.
Fig. 3. The arrow of evolutionary time is curling up in a time ball when
located in a multiple, complex biological system (square with small circles).
The length of evolutionary time in the same standard dimensional time is
multiplied, giving rise to an apparent concentration of changing (evolution-
ary) events in a particular period of conventional, dimensional time.
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closest to the intuition of time as a replicating entity. We
should admit that our choice of the qualification “metaphor”
to study the concept of time replication is based on what
Bergson himself stated in 1911. “It is of the very essence of
mechanism, in fact, to consider as metaphorical every
expression which attributes to time an effective action and a
reality of its own” [12]. Only occasionally does Bergson
relate the “impetus that pushes life along the road of time”
with time itself. But, at the end of his book Creative
Evolution, the point is well-presented: “If time is not a kind
of force, why does the universe unfold its successive states
with a velocity which, in regard to my consciousness, is a
veritable absolute? Why with this particular velocity rather
than any other? Why not with an infinite velocity?”. And
then: “The more I consider this point, the more it seems to me
that, […] time taken up by this succession is something other
than a number”. And, a few pages later, he insists on the cre-
ative quality of time: “Time is invention or is nothing at all”,
and the “substitution of time-length for time-invention”.
These ideas were further developed in 1920, by Samuel
Alexander, who probably offered a more relevant notion for
examining the role of time as an engine in the evolutionary
process. He considered time as composed of a continuum of
substantial instants (events?), able to engender the processes
modifying real objects [2]. In 1923, C. Lloyd Morgan devel-
oped the theory of emergent evolution, in which movement is
an intrinsically emergent quality of time (or time-space) from
which an impulse (nisus) is exerted on reality, forcing all
beings to produce increasing complex (perfect) entities [34].
These ideas have been hidden from most evolutionary biolo-
gists. Interestingly, only someone from the fields of mechan-
ics and thermodynamics, Prigogine, implicitly proposed time
as a replicating entity of biological creatures. In his view,
there is an “internal time” in the case of a chemical reaction,
that dies when this reaction arrives at equilibrium. In the case
of life, “an internal time is born, which is maintained along
thousands of millions of years of life, being transmitted from
one to other generation, from one to another species, and not
only is it transmitted, but it increases its complexity” [45]. In
even more recent times, Cahill and Klinger, working in
process physics, have re-invented the concept of “pseudo-
objects”, which, like Leibniz’s monads, have no intrinsic
existence and are defined only by how strongly they connect
with each other, serving as scaffolding to organize chaos into
order. Steve Rosen has suggested that time might be self-gen-
erating in a life-similar process by self-referential transfor-
mations [Time Groups (2000) http://www.egroups.com/
group/time]. Probably, in one way or another, from different
angles and origins, the concept of time replication has begun
to make its way into modern theoretical studies. 
An obvious caveat for accepting the present metaphor
about the role of time replication in driving the evolutionary
process, is that our driver is too general to be seriously con-
sidered. By applying a Bergsonian view and acknowledging
the complexity of the concept, time cannot be considered as
an appropriate object for scientific study. Moreover, the
Lamarckian notion of general “invisible fluids” (such as the
river of time) acting on evolution nowadays seems unfash-
ionable [37]. Classic ontological studies currently suffer
from similar criticism; as studying the nature of being (ens)
is too general to serve to explain anything. But, as ontology
has served to fuel philosophical research, the hypothesis of
time as a replicating entity may, at least, lead to a reconsider-
ation of the role of time as an essential implicit component of
evolutionary thought. Despite the view of some structural
biologists [21], we should not seek to free ourselves from
hypotheses-driven approaches, even if they are entirely theo-
retical. If we are interested in identifying the primary ele-
ments fueling Darwins’s pump [18], it is not only the first
“warm little pond” that should be investigated. Maybe the
bases needed for understanding the origin of any evolutionary
process are more deeply rooted than previously thought,. It is
therefore unfortunate that the scientific community involved
in evolutionary research has renounced theoretical investiga-
tions of time, one of the key words in evolution, but so rarely
mentioned in the index pages of texts on evolution. In the
years to come, increasing collaborations between physics and
biology will make explorations of the natural world more effi-
cient. What the Greeks called “metaphor” really means
“transfer” or “carry-over”. Like Prigogine [45], we believe
that time is an object of scientific interest. Our replicating-
time metaphor plays with the possibility of returning time
from its merely regulatory function in scientific inquiry to a
position as a real and creative constituent of Nature and, for
this reason, an object of research for natural sciences. 
Coda: time, evolution, and teleology
One of the major objections of Darwin to Lamarck’s theories
was their implicit notion that organisms exhibit an innate
drive towards complexity, a teleological sense. As was
recently discussed by Francisco J. Ayala [4], teleology
describes actions, objects, or processes that exhibit an orien-
tation towards a certain goal or end-state. In this sense, natu-
ral selection can be said to be a teleological process that
results in increased reproductive efficiency, so that reproduc-
tive fitness is the end result or goal of natural selection. Our
objection is that the production of time, rather than reproduc-
tive fitness may be the final end-state. Indeed the metaphor
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of time as a replicating entity may serve to better reconcile
those views advocating that, ultimately, evolution has a mean-
ing with those proposing that evolution is simply a meander-
ing process going nowhere in particular. In our metaphor, the
time-line does not precede the evolutionary process, rather
time emerges simultaneously with the evolutionary progress
line. In other words, the directional orientation of the process
is linked to the last element in the progression. There is indeed
a goal, to permit the replication of time, but it is not “external”
to the evolutionary trend. And, simultaneously, there is no
other direction than that of time replication, so that organismal
evolution may appear to be going elsewhere, or even nowhere,
but it is certainly not a random walk; it goes in the direction of
time replication. In other words, the replicating-time metaphor
is consistent with both internalist and externalist theories of
directional evolutionary change [24,26]. 
Theoretical biology has always been envious of theoreti-
cal physics [6], in which apparently well-grounded, immov-
able basic principles sustain a geometrically structured uni-
verse. Nevertheless, in recent years, physicists have become
suspicious of a fundamentally random universe, which has
motivated exchanging geometric-static models of reality for
biological ones. In this context, some research groups
involved in process physics have started to model time not as
geometry, but rather as a process, including that of self-repli-
cation. In their view, time and all of the objects around us,
including those on which evolution is acting, are nothing
more than the froth on a deep sea of randomness [14]. Time
and objects in evolution may be linked as part of this advanc-
ing front. In his book Protobiology, Koichiro Matsuno [38]
laid out the basis for a “physics of becoming” that s with the
classical “physics of being”. Conceptual biology has pene-
trated theoretical physics. Our metaphor, suggesting that
time, which could well be acting as a replicating entity,
expanding itself, and, as a result, fueling the evolving uni-
verse, may be considered as an example of this trend in the
field of theoretical biology. As Prigogine said, to read the his-
tory of the Universe as the history of “autonomous time” is
one of the most interesting temptations of contemporary sci-
ence [45]. The role of science is to propose and discover links
between natural objects, trying to overcome as much as pos-
sible, as Gould suggested [27], the parochial reasons of our
personal inexperience. For that reason, and at least as a
hypothesis, we should not exclude time, as a definitely cre-
ative force, from our considerations about the structural and
evolutionary frame of Nature.
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Evolución y naturaleza del tiempo
Resumen. En el pensamiento evolutivo, el concepto de tiempo es crítico,
pero los biólogos evolutivos raramente lo consideran como un objeto de
investigación teórica. La evolución significa una posibilidad de acceder al
futuro de los organismos replicativos; es decir, la recompensa evolutiva se
paga con la extensión del tiempo. La entidades replicativas obtienen tiempo,
pero para ellas el tiempo sólo sirve para replicarse, para evolucionar y para
expandir más allá la frontera del tiempo. Revisamos y tratamos aquí la posi-
ble influencia de considerar el tiempo, no como una mera dimensión (o una
condición intuitiva a priori para la experiencia humana), sino como un obje-
to en sí mismo. Al menos como una metáfora, podemos considerar el tiem-
po como una entidad autorreplicativa enraízada en los seres físicos (entre
ellos, los biológicos) que acaba produciendo tiempo dimensional. La autor-
replicación del tiempo fuerza a los seres a replicarse para sostener la sub-
siguiente replicación del tiempo. En este sentido, el conjunto tiempo-repli-
cación puede constituir la fuerza motriz, el motor básico que proporciona
energía direccional al proceso evolutivo. Se presentan aquí las raíces filosó-
ficas, los caveat y perspectivas de esta hipótesis. La metáfora del tiempo
replicativo juega con la posibilidad de devolver el tiempo desde su función
meramente reguladora de la investigación científica a una posición de con-
stituyente de la naturaleza real y creativo y por ello objeto de investigación
para las ciencias naturales. [Int Microbiol 2005; 8(2):81-91]
Palabras clave: evolución · tiempo evolutivo · tiempo (como entidad
replicativa) · tiempo (naturaleza)
Evolução e natureza do tempo
Resumo. No pensamento evolutivo, o conceito de tempo é crítico, mas os
biólogos evolutivos raramente o consideram como um objeto de pesquisa
teórica. A evolução significa uma possibilidade de acessar ao futuro dos
organismos replicativos; ou seja, a recompensa evolutiva é paga com a
extensão do tempo. A entidades replicativas obtêm tempo, mas para elas o
tempo só serve para se replicar, para evolucionar e para expandir além a
fronteira do tempo. Revisamos e tratamos aqui a possível influência de con-
siderar o tempo, não como uma mera dimensão (ou uma condição intuitiva
a priori para a experiência humana), mas como um objeto em si mesmo.
Pelo menos como uma metáfora, podemos considerar o tempo como uma
entidade autorreplicativa enraizada nas naturezas físicas (entre eles, os bio-
lógicos) que acaba produzindo tempo dimensional. A autorreplicação do
tempo força as naturezas a se replicar para sustentar a subseqüente replica-
ção do tempo. Neste sentido, o conjunto tempo-replicação pode constituir a
força motriz, o motor básico que proporciona energia direcional ao proces-
so evolutivo. Se apresentam aqui as raízes filosóficas, as advertências e as
perspectivas destas hipóteses. A metáfora do tempo replicativo joga com a
possibilidade de devolver o tempo desde sua função meramente reguladora
da pesquisa científica a uma posição de constituinte da natureza real e cria-
tivo e por isso objeto de pesquisa para as ciências naturais. [Int Microbiol
2005; 8(2):81-91]
Palavras chave: evoluçao · tempo evolutivo · tempo como entidade
replicativa · tempo (natureza)

